

A PHILOSOPHICAL

DEBATE

BETWEEN

B — and L —

INSCRIBED TO

Capt. John Godfrey,

One of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace
for the County of *Middlesex*, and City and Li-
berties of *Westminster*.

Ex nova fert Animus mutatas dicere formas
Corpora — Ovid.

Materiam superabat Opus. — Ovid.

Hæ Nugæ

In seria ducunt. — Hor.

L O N D O N.

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MDCCXLII.

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TO

CAPT. JOHN GODFREY.

SIR,

NOTWITHSTANDING *In-*
cense to unworthy Objects is every
where justly discountenanced, by *Sense*, *Law*,
and *Religion*, yet in what Age has *Panegy-*
rick been more prostituted than in ours? or
when more Altars smoaking, though so few
'Themes *deserving* of Encomium?

Whilst the most valuable and masterly
Performances are sometimes consecrated to
meer *Triflers* of *Rank* (and I wish like the
Emperor *Domitian*, catching Flies was their
sole Crime) shall I for once venture to be so
quite out of that *important* Thing call'd
Fashion (and *Modes*, the *chief Subject* of these
Pages

IV.

DEDICATION.

Pages,) as to dedicate this Trifle of Mr. B—'s and mine to one of your true Taste?

The best *Apology* for this *Liberty* (now it is taken) is to assure *you* that you shall not here be troubled with *fulsome* Compliments, *common* to Dedications; and it may not perhaps inconsiderably contribute to atone for this *Boldness*, if I remind you, that this Dispute *wholly* owes its *Birth* to your good *Humour* of setting *B.* and *me* upon this *Tryal* of Skill; for otherwise I must own, a *Champion* of less Renown than you might serve to decide the *Cui Dabo* in this important Scuffle, and to decree the Honour of a *Triumph* to the mighty *Victor*.

Now, though you know its *Rise* and *Progress*, yet how far it may *extend* (since *no Beings*, it seems, have Length) Time alone must declare.

But it may not be improper to inform the *Publick*, that this *Debate* commenced at the ——— in *Holbourn*; was next accidentally continu'd at ——— near *Covent-Garden*,
then

then *B's* Part of it (since *Trifles* must be divided) was by *himself* dress'd up in a Sheet of Paper and in that Trim made its Way to you; how you entertain'd it I shall not presume to say, though I fancy just as it deserved; for it came to my Hands from you, I believe, *in statu quo*, destitute of all *Substance*, a meer *no Being*; but *modish* enough.

Now as sterling *Worth* may even with a good *Grace* sometimes condescend benignly to smile on a low *Performance*, I am in hopes you'll throw a favourable *Glance* on this *Trifle* of ours, that it may *thereby* be encourag'd, *conscious* of your generous Protection, to make its *Appearance* in the World, and look with a tolerable *Mein* (if *no Beings* are capable of *such*) and in Recompense of your necessary *Patronage*, I must say you can never meet with a fairer *Opportunity* of exercising your *Patience* and good *Nature*; (for I dare not offer to your *Judgment* and *Censure* such a *Piece* as this, though I shall freely *acquiesce* in

VI.

DEDICATION.

in your candid *Decision*) and of *practising* many *Virtues* at once. But I forget I am here putting you upon the *easiest* Task in the World, your *own* Track, the *common* Road, the good old *Way*, you are now never likely to forsake. Some perhaps may, at present, imagine I am going to desire you to fit for your *Picture*. Were that to be *drawn* I confess I have no Talent that way, and have a Hand too *unskilful* to delineate any of your Features. Not but that, in spite of your severe and forbidding *Modesty* and my *Want* of Skill in the masterly *Strokes* of the delicate and *difficult* Art of drawing *Characters*, were you confin'd to any *one* Set of Perfections, (and till then I shall not, at least in *Form* attempt any Thing in your Praise) I could name not a *few* Instances of Capt. *Godfrey's* good *Sense*, *Candour*, *Courage*, *Honour*, *Generosity* and good *Nature*.

Or were you even content to be the *Delight* and *Ornament* of your Acquaintance, and (in *Harmony* with *Virtue* and *Truth*) their pleasant

fant *Guide* to social *Felicity*, one could *then* venture to be somewhat particular.

But to *address* (with any Shew of doing Justice) one of *your* Stamp, the ablest Pen would be at a Stand; for who is *capable* of writing the History of *Worth* (and in *every* thing of this *Nature*, *Envy* itself cannot deny *you* some Share) or keep *Pace* with Persons *ever* pursuing and practising *something* Praise-worthy?

Titus, I remember, could weep and think *that* Day lost wherein he had done no *Good*; (and 'tis pity every one design'd for *Heaven* should not be of his *Mind*) few *such* Days, if any, I dare say are to be found in the *Calendar* of *your* Time.

The *Emperour*, every one knows, undoubtedly, had more in his *Power* than you; but had he more *Good* in his *Will*? *Neminem unquam tristem dimisit*, was said of him as a common Proverb; and if the *Voice* of the People stands for any thing (and great *Reverence* is surely due to the *Publick*) the *Cap*
fits

fits you so well that *this* seems *voted* your future *Motto*, and I need not inform the most Ignorant of what the *Latin* means; your *Actions*, though undesignedly, being its *hourly* most elegant *Interpreters*.

But to return to my Friend B. I beg he may be inform'd of this Piece of *News*, that I have *seiz'd* on all his *Modes*, notwithstanding their pleading *Non Existence* (for I have always dreaded your *no Beings* above all Things) and bound them over to their good Behaviour for the time to come, nay I've even gone so far as to close confine them (according to philosophical Law) in my own and the Publick's Defence, to the perpetual Service of their respective *Substances*, whether Visible or Invisible. Now I can't foresee what new Plea B. can make to entice them from their natural Duty.

Surely he won't pretend to remove any *single Mode* at his Pleasure, (whilst he considers it as a *no Being*) by a *Habeas Corpus*; the Laws and Proceedings of every Substantial Court

DEDICATION

IX.

Court, as well as the Interest of the very Modes themselves being quite against him.

I wait however with Patience the ultimate Result of *B.* his Confederate no Beings, and their Allies, and with Pleasure and Respect take this Opportunity to own myself,

SIR,

your obliged, obedient


humble Servant.

L.



THE
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
LONDON
TO THE
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
LONDON
TO THE
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
LONDON





A

PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE, &c.

SIR,

UPON Sight of Mr. B—'s to you, I sat down at Mr. W—'s, and *there* drew up the following *Answer* to it.

If you meet with any Thing in it, that may contribute to *amuse* you, and prove *serviceable* to B. I have gain'd my End. As I have all due Regard for his *Person*, tho' none for his *Principles* (because I think they deserve none) if any Thing herein may seem to carry the least *Sting* in it, I desire it may be taken, as pointed *solely* at his *Principles*; his good *only* being aim'd at by *exposing* them, not any *Victory* over him; for I had much rather win his *Person* to embrace the *Truth*, than conquer *it*. For I have ever look'd upon it as a greater *Glory* and *Satisfaction* gently to persuade, than to subdue by *Dint* of Argument.

B 2

But

But it being too often the *Case*, in *Controversy* to omit what is *material* in an *Adversary*, you'll perhaps judge me over-cautious in this *Respect*; for you have here *B—'s entire* Discourse, together with my *Answer* to it, tho' this may be some *Apology* for the *Prolixity* of this Letter.

A capital *B*, or *L*, at the *Beginning* of a Line distinguishes *our* respective Parts. *B*. denotes *his*; *L*. *mine*.

What pass'd between *us*, in a *philosophical Way*, before *this* in *Conference* and *Writing*, is *here* suppos'd and sometimes refer'd to.

SIR,

B. I *modifically*, *viz.* *accidentally* met in Company with *L*——Monday Evening last, when he retracted or rather deny'd his former Assertion, *viz.* that *Extension* is the *Essence of Matter*, which possibly you, as well as some others, may remember; be that as it will, the following Syllogism is what he then gave me under his Hand, which is directly of the same Stamp.

L. 'Tis *hard* to conceive how a Gentleman, who affirms *Modes* to be *no Beings*, cou'd meet me *modifically*; but be that as it will, his *Principles* once known, none of his Expressions ought to surprise, tho' who cou'd have imagin'd him unable to distinguish
between

between *contingently*, which alone can be meant, by the word, *accidentally* here, and what he, in the *modern Dialect* perhaps of the *Materialists*, calls *modifically*, tho' in his way of thinking, without a Possibility of having any Idea annex'd unto it. At least *modifically*, if it any where stands for Sense, can never mean, *accidentally*, till B. produces his Power to make any Number of Letters signify what he pleases, and reconciles This with his discarding all *Beings*, except the *chymærical ones* of his more than omnipotent Creation.

If he has no *Patent* for this, and that it wont pass current with the Publick, he must e'en treasure it up with the rest of his invaluable Stock of *no Beings*, till there be a greater Call for such *rare Commodities*; till then such a Person is rather to be pitied than envy'd in the imaginary rich Possession of all his *non Entities*, by those, who upon a solid Foundation enjoy the substantial Knowledge of *Real Beings*.

Without *Reserve* then I *appeal*; (tho' B. does it with the *Caveat* of, *be that as it will*) to you and the Company present at our Debates, whether at either Time I affirm'd *Extension* to be the *Essence of Matter*, nay even B. himself owns the quite contrary under his Hand (as may be easily seen) in the first Paper

per penn'd by him and me, and lodg'd by our mutual Consent in the Hands of Mr. G.

You may remember *Sir*, that arguing against *B's*. *Argumento ad hominem*, trying to bring him to define the *Essence of Matter*, (for who more than these Gentlemen fly from definitions, tho' they pretend to nothing less than Demonstration?) I said *Extension*, its *Adjuncts* and *Consequents*, might, for aught he or any of the Fraternity of pretended Free-Thinkers knew, be the very *Essence of Matter*; and believe I shall never see any just Cause either to retract or deny what I then did, and now do affirm; however I have never yet done either, whatever Assertions or appeals *B.* makes to the Contrary. I gave him the Syllogism he mentions, and allow it, as he expresses it, to be of the same Stamp with my former Assertion, it being the very Argument then made use of, wherein he pretends I affirm'd *Extension* to be the *Essence of Matter*; but the Syllogism itself fully refutes his Charge, no such thing therein being discoverable at least by any *Being*, the Task being wholly reserv'd for this mighty *Man of Modes*.

The Syllogism, however it seems is false; if so, why don't *B.* point out some at least of its Defects, whether they relate to its *Matter* or its *Form*, or to both; till then I think I have

a Right to beleive it true, and every way conformable to the Rules of Logick, because I am certain it bears the Test of the grand Criterion of all Syllogisms, which not one of his *modish* ones is able to do; witness his first, thus wrote by himself, in the above mention'd Paper.

A *Mode* is an *Accident* of some Subject or Being, but not *the Being*.

Nothing but a *Being* has Existence,

Therefore a *Mode* is *no Being*.

The Matter and Form of this his (pretended) Syllogism are both defective.

The Matter will appear so by distinguishing his first Proposition, *viz.*

A *Mode* is an *Accident* of some Subject or Being, but not *the Being*;

I distinguish, but not the *Being* of which it is a *Mode*; I grant, but not a *Being*, which is the the point B. was to prove, tho' he is wide of the Mark; I deny, for a *Mode* is a *real Being*, tho' not *the Being*, of which it is a *Mode*.

His second Proposition, to wit, *nothing but a Being has Existence*, is fallacious and not to the Purpose in hand; fallacious, because it aims at proving a *Mode* to have no Existence, and Existence to be essential to *Beings*, neither of which is true; not the first, because *Modes* necessarily exist, wherever there are Subjects;

nor the second, because Existence is not essential to any *Being*, but to the independent *Being*, the all powerfull Creator of all arbitrary and contingent *Beings*: to no purpose, because it no way proves the Point, for from a *Mode's* being an Accident of some *Subject* or *Being*, and not the *Being* of which it is a *Mode*, and from nothing but a *Being's* having Existence, how does it follow that a *Mode* is *no Being*, whatever is possible and intelligible, tho' not actually existing, having the true Nature of a *Being* as well as what actually exists?

Wherefore the *last Proposition*, to wit, that a *Mode is no Being*, is evidently *false*, a *Mode* being intelligible, possible, and existing.

As to the *Form* of this pretended *Syllogism*, it would be tedious to enumerate every *Rule* of true Reasoning it is opposite to; at present let us only see whether it stands the *Test* of the grand *Criterion* of true and false *Syllogisms*, which you know to be *this*.

One of the Premisses ought to prove the Conclusion to be contain'd in the other.

Now does either of B——'s *Premisses* prove his *Conclusion* to be contain'd in the other?

If he says, one of his *Premisses* does; let *him* name *which*, and *shew* it does so; for
without

without performing *this*, or proving the *Rule* itself false there's no persuading any one, who has the least Notion of *Logick*, that what *B* calls *Syllogisms* are such; all *his* being unluckily of the very same *Stamp* with *this*.

After all, whenever he has done *either*, I'll warrant him the Destruction of all *substantial*, and the Introduction of a *modish Logick* to his Mind, and *guarantee* also to *him*, thro' all *Ages* and *Classes* of Men, the glorious *Title*, (due to the great Sir ISAAC NEWTON) of the *Prince* of *Philosophers*; but if he can do *neither*, and *Modesty* be one of his *Modes* (and I should be glad he cou'd, for a while at least, allow this *becoming Virtue* a Rank in the *Category* of *Beings*) it would soon oblige *him*, in Justice to *himself* and *Company*, for the future to forswear *all* Pretension to *Syllogism*, till he has learn'd to form one.

B. and is as follows.

Every Mode of Matter is extended;

Thought is unextended;

Therefore Thought is no Mode of Matter.

The Major of this *Syllogism* I object to for the following Reason.

L. I grant that to be my *Syllogism*, but then (according to the just *Rules* of Reasoning) ought not every *Major*, or *Minor*, either be *allow'd*, *deny'd*, or *distinguish'd*, not.

C

objected

objected to after *this Gentleman's* manner?

Let us however hear *what he offers*, by way of *Reason* for his so doing, tho' with much *more Reason*, just after, as *you see*, he calls it a *Supposition*, and so it is indeed, and a very *groundless* one too.

B. Let us suppose any (*material*) *Being* existing viz. a *Sphere*.

L. Why the Word (*material*) here within a *Parenthesis*, since, according to him, every *Being* is *material*? Why again (*material*) thus distinguish'd, when a *Sphere* is supposed to be the *Being*? for whoever thought of an *immaterial Sphere*? But his Reasoning upon this *Supposition* is somewhat *curious*.

B. it will then be extended, and exist under that particular *Mode*.

L. So it will till it *ceases* to be *Matter* or a *Sphere*; but then what does B mean by the Word *it*? An *Essence* or *Substance*, or *Mode*? *Either* it *must* be; yet *neither* can mean any thing in *his Way*.

Not the *first*, because of *these*, he owns he has no *Idea*.

Nor the *latter*, because, according to *him*, no *Being*.

Hence I'll venture to affirm, *he* can have no *Idea at all*, unless he can *create* a new World of *Objects*; and *here*, notwithstanding his great *Authority*, I much doubt his Power.

Essences

Essences and Substances, it seems, being *unintelligible*; for want of *Ideas*.

And *Modes* too, because *no Beings*; *unintelligible* therefore for want of *Properties*.

Now is it not pleasant to hear a *Gentleman* of *these Principles* (and these you know to be truly *B--'s*) harangue upon an *it*, of which he has no *Idea* (to him therefore utterly *unintelligible*) existing under a particular *Mode*; that is, having a *Being*, without a *Being*, under a particular *Mode*, *i. e.* under a particular *Nothing*, and forsooth, after all, even *extended*.

But why all this? Understand it who can? And He, that can, may at the same Time with all Ease conceive every kind of *Absurdity* and *Contradiction*, and we know such are by *wholesale* frequently swallow'd down by the nicest *Free-thinkers*, notwithstanding their noisy Claim to calm *Reason*, and strict *Demonstration*; but, I doubt, they are too hard for all rational *Beings*, and even for all *Modes*, stript off, or gifted with *Being* at *B--'s* good Pleasure.

B. Now if the *Mode* be extended and the *Being* be extended there will be two *extendeds*.

L. In *B--'s Way* there can neither be one or two *extendeds*; because neither *Being*, *Extension*, nor *Mode*, as has been demonstrated.

But in the rational *Way*, where is the Contradiction in admitting two, or any number of *extendeds*, since *Matter*, or any of its *Modes*, can't exist without *Extension*, and that *Extension* is in both infinitely various?

If *B.* can, he wou'd do well to prove any *Mode* of *Matter* *unextended*.

A *Sphere*, or any Portion of *Matter*, any thing besides *Extension*, its *Adjuncts* and *Consequents*.

B. If there are two *Extendeds*, as must needs be if the *Mode*, besides the *Being*, be *extended*.

L. There are not only two, but numberless *extendeds*, every thing in *Matter*, whether *Mode* or *Substance*, being divisible in *infinitum*, and therefore *extended*, the above *Sphere* then will for ever be *extended* and its *Mode* likewise be *extended*, till *B* proves either indivisible.

B. Then let the *Being* exist under any other *Mode*.

L. Tho' *Matter* and every Part of *Matter*, (were it as minute even as any of *Epicurus's* Atoms) with all their *Modes*, essentially exist *extended*, and each *Mode* (to correspond to that, without which *Matter* itself can't exist) must necessarily be *extended*; yet no one determin'd Quantity of *Extension*, being essential to any Portion of *Matter*, consider'd precisely

precisely as such, any *Mode* of Matter is easily apprehended to succeed another without destroying its Subject or *Extension*, every particular Quantity of *Extension* being separable and alterable *in infinitum*, wherefore tho' a Portion of *Matter* existing in a Spherical Form, can't exist as a *Sphere*, if the Form constitutive of that *Figure* be chang'd, yet the *Matter* it self exists after the Change of its particular external *Figure* or *Mode*, and must necessarily exist under another *Mode*, if the Spherical *Figure* be alter'd as supposed.

B. I ask then what is become of the former *Mode*.

L. 'Tis still intelligibly extended, and actually applicable to any Portion of Matter; a *Being* therefore yet, whether it has actual *Existence* or not; but as B--'s *Talent* seems chiefly to lye in *no Beings*, I should be proud of a *Sample* of his reasoning, upon the former *Modes* Non-existence, and dwindling into *nothing*.

B. For if the said *Mode* was extended, independently of the Subject, it wou'd still be extended as at first.

L. The very Definition of a *Mode* forbids its natural Independency of its Subject; wherefore 'tis contrary to its nature, and every Way unphilosophical to talk of its *independent* Extension, yet not more so than it is to speak of a Subject's being *extended, independent*

dent of its *Modes*, their reciprocal Dependence notwithstanding neither destroy the Distinction between Matter, or any other Subject, and their respective *Modes*, nor any of either of their separate Properties.

Each particular *Sphere* then, as well as its Spherical *Mode*, is (tho mutually depending on each other) for ever inconceivable, and therefore impossible, without the very same *Extension*, both *Sphere* and *Mode* had at first.

B. I affirm, in the latter Case, that the former *Mode* will cease to exist, and consequently is *no Being*.

L. And I affirm that if, in any Case, the former *Mode* will cease to exist, it must have *Existence*, and is therefore a *Being*, according to the second Proposition of B—'s first pretended *Syllogism*, which is this, *Nothing but a Being has Existence*; but of this more by and by.

Here you see B—'s latter Case is, if a *Sphere* exists under any other *Mode*, the former *Mode* will cease to exist; but this Case is impossible; for how can a *Sphere* exist under any other *Mode*? the Matter indeed of a *Sphere* may, but not that quantity of *Extension*, which determines any Portion of Matter to be a *Sphere*.

Yet were the Case possible, his Point thereby

thereby would not be a whit the better prov'd; for it will never follow that a *Mode* is therefore *no Being* because it will cease to exist, Existence not being of the *Essence* of any *Being* but of the *Supreme*, but merely contingent and not necessary with relation to all *other Beings*; Possibility not Actuality, being sufficient to constitute any *Being* as such, except the *self Existent*, tho' *Modes* as well as Substances enjoy *both*, and are therefore in every Sense *Beings*.

But as *B.* seems right or wrong to aim at carrying his Point, to wit, that a *Mode* is *no Being*, because it will cease to exist, and that this appears to be the *Sum* and *Substance* of all he has to say, in Defence of what he so confidently affirms, tho' even from his very Proof the Reverse is evident, I shall here somewhat enlarge upon this Matter.

First, if from its being possible for *Modes* to cease to exist, we could justly infer *Modes* to be *no Beings*, we may likewise conclude that because, by Almighty Power, all *Beings* exclusive of the *Deity*, *Substances* as well as *Modes*, may cease to exist, there then can be no *Being* at all, except *God*.

But if *B.* says that *God*, even *God*, can't annihilate any thing that exists, but that whatever is once in Actuality must for ever have Existence and remain so, it will follow, that no
Mode

Mode can ever *cease* to exist by Omnipotency it self, much less, by the Succession of another *Mode*, since the *ceasing* to exist necessarily presupposes *Existence*, and consequently a *Being*.

On the other hand, if *B* grants that *God* has it in his Power to cause all *Beings* but himself to *cease* to exist, and that yet from hence it does not follow that other *Beings* are no *real Beings*, pray how can it be prov'd from the Possibility of a *Mode's* *ceasing* to exist, that a *Mode* is no *Being*?

For let *B* turn to which Side he pleases, a *Mode* either must be a very *Being*, or there's no *Being* at all, but the Supreme, and a *Mode* even must be a *Being*, whether it can or cannot *cease* to exist, both equally presupposing *Existence*.

Secondly, is it not evident, that if, as *B* tells us, nothing but a *Being* has *Existence*, that nothing but a *Being* can *cease* to have *Existence*? Now he affirms a *Mode* will *cease* to exist, must it not then have *Existence*, and consequently be a *Being*? for how can a *no-Being* *cease* to have a *Being*, *ceasing* to have *Being* essentially presupposing a *Being*?

Now in Form.

A Mode will cease to exist;

Therefore a Mode has Existence;

For Nothing sure will *cease* to exist that has not *Existence*.

The

The former Mode, according to B, will cease to exist.

Ergo, the former Mode has Existence;

Now, Nothing has Existence but a Being;

The former Mode has Existence;

Ergo, the former Mode is a Being.

Or thus, Nothing will cease to exist but a Being;

A Mode, ex Concessis, will cease to exist;

Ergo, ex concedendis, a Mode is a Being.

Or again, whatever exists is a Being;

A Mode exists, (because it may cease to exist);

Ergo; a Mode is a Being.

To conclude this Head, as Existence is not essential to any Substance but to the Independent, tho' it is essential to every Substance that exists, to exist with *Modes*, the Existence of *Substances* being inseparable from that of *Modes*; it is evident that if nothing but *Beings* can have Existence, *Modes* must be truly such, they coexisting with and being essentially found, wherever there are *Substances*.

B. From whence it follows, that no *Mode* but the *Being*, of which it may be predicated, is that which is extended.

L. Here *B.* allows, contrary to his Principles, that a *Mode* may be predicated; now if it may, must it not be a *Being*, unless *Nothing* can have Properties? Thus, Sir, you

D

see,

see, he once more overturns all he has been hitherto contending for.

But what is this *Being*, of which the *Mode* may be predicated?

B. 'Tis that which is extended.

L. If *B* speaks here consistently with himself, this can't be a *Substance* or *Essence*, for of these he has inform'd us he has no *Idea*, therefore they may be *Nothings* for any thing he knows; it must then be a *Mode* and that, even according to him, is still *no Being*.

Wherefore his Argument will run thus.

From whence it follows that no no Being, but the no Being, of which the no Being may be predicated, is the no Being which is extended.

Whatever, Sir, you may think of this surprising Discovery in the way of *Reasoning*, little better, than such *jargon* as this, can be expected from your greatest Pretenders to the *modish Free-thinking* that now reigns; for is this, or any thing like it, (according to *Sense*, *Reason*, or the Rules of *Syllogism*, and Laws of *Demonstration*) ever reducible to *Mood* and *Figure*, or any other just *Standard* of sound, and solid Judgement. 'Tis however but a candid *Specimen* of *B—'s* learn'd Arguments, according to his avow'd *Principles*.

B. the Minor of this *Syllogism* is sophistical, defective and lame.

L.

L. Bad enough if so, the Minor is this;
Thought is unextended.

But wherein it deserves the Epithets *B* here bestows upon it, he ought to have shewn; for had it been sophistical, defective and lame, his *Reason* no way shews it to be either, all the *Sophistry* in the World not being able to hinder what he is going to offer as a Proof of his *Affertion*, (it is so very defective and lame) from visibly halting at its first Appearance.

B. For it should be, *Thought* is an unextended *Mode*, for if it be no *Mode*, to be sure it can't be so of *Matter*, or any thing else.

L. But why should the Minor be, *Thought is an unextended Mode*? Was I to prove it a *Mode* at all? Was not the very *Point* then to be made out against *B* this, that *Thought was no Mode of Matter*? It is evident it was, and that only, as may be seen at Mr. G—'s under both our Hands. The contrary being the very thing then asserted by *B*, and the darling Hypothesis of modern *Materialists*: tho' the Nature of *Thought* too could have been sufficiently accounted for, were it then brought upon the Tapis; but at that Time it was only requisite to clear up, as I did, the *Point*, then in Question.

B. Besides, as it is not self-evident, that it is unextended, by a bare *ipse dixit*, it requires Proof thereof.

L. I never gave an *ipse dixit* for an Answer to any Difficulty, much less for a Stamp of self-evidence, tho' I receive very little more than *ipse dixit*s from B, by way of Proof of his Assertions, and Pretence to *Syllogism*, as well as for his charging my *Arguments* with Defects, for he has not yet singled out one and made good his Charge, had he nevertheless demanded any farther Prooff of My Minor, and Scholar like, either deny'd, or distinguish'd it, and I then should have prov'd it thus:

Every indivisible is unextended,

Thought is indivisible,

Therefore Thought is unextended:

This *Syllogism* must for ever flash evidence to the unprejudic'd Understanding, and thereby command the Assent, till B or some other *Materialist*, is able to produce (at least by fair reasoning) a *Peice* of an *Idea*, or about half an *Ounce*, or even a *less* Quantity of *Speculation*; or if they had rather (for I am willing to indulge them as much as possible) a *Yard* or two of *Thought*, nay even a single *Inch* barely to make a *Blind* to keep of its Light, and thereby engage us to recall our Assent.

But this requires greater Address than ever *Prometheus* or *Mercury* had, and demands more than the fam'd Skill of *Drucalion* and *Pyrrha*;

Pyrrha; wherefore I am opinion that we must, for Reasons not hard to guess at, rest contented with *Thought's being no Mode of Matter*, because *unextended* and *indivisible*.

B. But to have done with visionary *Beings*.

L. Well done if possible, and this would be doing something indeed, for if *B* can have done with *Beings* before he has begun with them (and this he must do to have done with *visionary Beings*) he's in a fair way of proving that a *Mode* will cease to exist, tho' it has no *Existence*; but alas! how is this possible, since *visionary Beings*, as well as *Modes*, are Realities, and with such he can have no Dealing for want of *Ideas*; therefore can't have done with them, having never, as far as appears, begun with any real *Beings* at all, and visionary ones are such. *B* then should rather have said to have done with meer *imaginary Beings*, Imagination being the sole *Parent* of all the *Beings* he seems *philosophically* acquainted with, but then it is a frequent and fruitful Source of matchless *Folly* and *Error*.

Examples, every where too too numerous, leave no room to doubt of this melancholly Truth; even *B*—'s own groundless *Chymera's* (for what else can be the Result of his *Way* of thinking?) are a glaring Instance of it, as well as of the Weakness of human Nature, and
of

of the Exactness of *Tully's* Remark, where this great Man tells us that, *nothing is so absurd but what some Philosopher or other has affirm'd*; not that I, in the least, in that Sense, suppose *B* can be meant here.

I can't however see how 'tis possible for him ever to get rid of imaginary *Beings*, till he has, according to the *Poet*, Courage enough at once to shake them off and wholly divest himself of them.

*Optimus ille Animus, ludentia Pectus,
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.*

and in their Room, substitutes solid *Principles*; for who can launch into the *intellectual* World without *Ideas*? And who can have *Ideas* without *Objects*, possible or existing?

Now all these by *B*—'s *Principles* and reasoning are utterly discarded from the human Mind.

A bold Stroke indeed! after which, pray what's left for this Gentleman to have *Ideas* of? Why just *nothing*; where then is he likely to fix on surefooting?

Wherefore if his Judgments and Reasoning are conformable and consequential to his *Ideas*, (if he has any of these, and this they ought to be, unless, opposite to the Sense and Reason of all *Mankind*, as well as to every *Principle* and *Rule* of *Science*, he'll undertake

take to judge and reason by his sole *Authority* without *Ideas*), we then may always expect to be furnish'd by *him* with every desir'd Variety of fine *Demonstrations*, upon all sorts of *imaginary no Beings*. For in something not unlike this he has already display'd to us his great Abilities; and how can it be otherwise, it being no easy Task for a *free-Thinker*, with all the Command he has of himself, to quite shake off all his old, supple, complaisant, *modish* Acquaintance, were they even as meagre as *Ghosts*, *unextended* and without *Parts*, as *B* represents a *mathematical Point*, to strike in of a sudden with a new set of real, sturdy, and unpliant *Creatures* call'd *Substances*, who never yet gave ground, no not the Breadth of a single *Inch* without securing several *Modes*, and, by vertue of a *Power* they have been always in possession of, close confining them, as their own Properties, and as so many *real Beings*, even to all the different and capricious Dispositions of every, be it never so insignificant, a *Substance*. Now do you think *B* could bear, tho' there's no help for it, to see his dear *Modes* (all *no Beings* as they are) to be thus *treated*?

Considering then *B*—'s *Case*, I wish we could let his *Beings* pass for *visionary*, but *Vision* constantly presupposing *Reality*, this can't be done, till the World turns *Materialist*

alist and is brought to entertain (and there can never be any just reason for this) as irrational Sentiments of *God* and another *State*, as the present *Materialists* themselves, which it ought to do, (if his Reasonings were *Visions* or what he calls visionary *Beings* truly such), for obtruding upon us, for *Realities*, the Heaps of Absurdities and Contradictions, *B* and the Fraternity he's of, must necessarily assent or pretend to assent to, to act *consistently* with what they themselves call their *Principles*, or voluntarily, and obstinately, after fair Conviction, persist in their *Way* of thinking, contrary to all *Evidence* and *Truth*, *pertinaciæ nullum remedium posuit Deus*. I have frequently observed with the learn'd Sir *Francis Bacon* that a smattering of *Learning* often makes *Atheists*, but that drinking deep sobers them again and brings them back to Reason and Religion.

B. (Except in the following Syllogism) and taking this Syllogist's Minor for granted, I think the under Syllogism is more conclusive, rational, and pertinent than his.

L. You see *B* is not yet willing to part with his pretended *visionary Beings*, he'd still rather hugg them than *Realities*, and it must be so in the Road he's got into, for as his great master *Hobbs* says, *when Reason is against a Man, a Man will be against Reason*,
this

This is his State, his *Cause* being defenceless, and therefore against *Reason* at least, all his Reasoning hitherto, and Attempt to Argument, prove such as I think has been fully shewn, and the rest is like to turn out no better, such a sworn Enemy is good Mr. B. to all *Substance* and *Reality*, and therefore to all *Reason* and *Truth*, as will appear by his last pretended *Syllogism*, when it comes to be tried; for 'twill then be found neither *Substance* nor *Mode*, having neither *Matter* nor *Form*, being neither in *Mood* nor *Figure* (except the wretched *Figure*, *Infidelity*, mistaken for *Free-thinking*, now deservedly makes in the intellectual World) destitute therefore of every Ingredient of a true *Syllogism*, as far as he's concern'd in it (for the second Proposition is one of my Minors, true in itself, but wholly misapplied by him) and consequently can neither be conclusive, rational, nor pertinent; tho' had it been all three, I would fain know why, even then, it should be more *conclusive* than mine, mine being in good *Form*? Why more *rational*, mine being *true*; or why more *pertinent*, mine directly proving its *Point*?

But now 'tis high Time to examine what B. has offer'd as a *Syllogism*.

After taking then for granted my *Minor*, which he before, without the least Founda-

tion, as has been already seen, call'd sophistical, defective and lame, *B* proceeds to lay down his own *Syllogism*,

B. viz. A mathematical Point is unextended;

Thought is unextended;

Therefore Thought is a mathematical Point.

L. 'Tis worth observing here how fond a *Materialist* would always be of laying hold of every Handle, at any rate, to change *Matter* into *Spirit*, and *vice versa*, *Spirit* into *Matter*; tho' if you'll take their Words for it, they believe *nothing*, no not their own *Existence*, but by the irresistible Force of pure *Demonstration*, but I am afraid they are mostly content with the bare *Sound*, seldom or never pursuing the *Thing*.

As to the *Argument* itself, I say.

First, 'tis not in *Form*, the *two first Propositions* being *particular*; from which (according to all Rules of just reasoning) nothing can be truly concluded, as is easily *demonstrable*.

Secondly, because neither of the *Premises* proves its *Conclusion* to be contain'd in the other.

Next, tho' I am not ignorant of what has been said by *Mathematicians* on the Head of this *Point*, against *B* I thus prove the *Matter* of this *Argument*, as far as 'tis his, to be false,

false, to wit, that a *mathematical Point* is not *unextended*, but in Imagination; and therefore *Thought* no way prov'd by him a *mathematical Point*; and what more have we here for his Conclusion, than his bare *ipse dixit*?

Wherefore it may be justly denied with the same Air and Facility 'tis affirm'd; however, as I prefer *reasoning* to *dogmatizing*, here's a *Syllogism* to prove what I propos'd.

Nothing is unextended but a Spirit, or a Mode of Spirit,

A mathematical Point is neither Spirit, nor a Mode of Spirit,

Therefore a mathematical Point is not unextended.

His second Proposition I before hinted to be the *Minor* of one of my *Syllogisms*, and I ought to be allow'd to look upon it as true, having, I think, prov'd it such, till *B* shews any Error, either in it, or in the Proof produc'd to establish it.

Wherefore I'll now proceed to shew (*ex abundanti*) the Falshood of his Argument, both as to *Matter* and *Form*, after another Method, to wit, by some *Parallel Propositions*, (which may be justly rank'd in the lowest Class of *Sophistry*) for *Examples* sometimes instruct better than *Precepts*.

Take then a few *Parallel Sophisms* (and it were easy to bring any Number) but according

according to the Rule, *ex pede Herculem* or *ex ungue Leonem*, here's enough of them to discover B—'s uncommon Knowledge in the *Syllogistick Art*, as well as his deep Inspection into the *Nature* of Things.

I'll just mention B—'s *Argument* here, that the *Parallel* thereby may be perceiv'd at one Cast of the Eye.

B—'s *Syllogism*.

*A mathematical Point is unextended,
Thought is unextended,
Therefore Thought is a mathematical Point.*

1st. *Parallel*.

*A Sphere is extended,
A Quadrangle is extended,
Therefore a Quadrangle is a Sphere.*

2d. *Par.*

*God is a Spirit,
The Devil is a Spirit,
Therefore the Devil is God.*

3d. *Par.*

*Swearing is a Vice,
Drunkeness is a Vice,
Therefore Drunkeness is Swearing.*

4th. *Par.*

*Aristotle was alive,
Balaam's Ass was alive,
Therefore Balaam's Ass was Aristotle.*

5th. *Par.*

A profound Philosopher is a Man,

B--

B-- is a Man,

Therefore B-- is a profound Philosopher.

Now 'tis evident that, if from a *mathematical Point's* being *unextended* (tho' I have *demonstrated* 'tis not) and from *Thought's* being *unextended*, it would follow that *Thought* was a *mathematical Point*, it must likewise follow, from the *Premises* of the above *Sophisms*, that a *Quadrangle* is a *Sphere*, the *Devil* God, that *Drunkeness* is *Swearing*, that *Balaam's Ass* was *Aristotle*, and even that *B--* is a profound *Philosopher*.

I had almost forgot to tell you that these *Sophisms* have one Advantage above *B--'s*, as to their *Matter*, viz. that their *Premisses* are all true, tho' they are out of *Form*, as well as his, as is easily seen at the first Glance.

By this you may perceive, Sir, what strange Consequences a Man may be driven to for Want of a little *Skill* in *Logick*; and that between such sort of Reasoning as *his*, or such *Sophisms* and true *Syllogism*, there's at least as much Difference, as there is between true *Wit* and *Punning*, strict *Demonstration*, and a *Jest* for all *Argument*.

Hence also you see, that 'tis not out of any high Opinion I have of, or any other Delight I take in, such *Trifles*, that I have produc'd these few home *Instances*, but chiefly to shew the World my *respectfull*
Willing-

Willingness to *answer* any the least of your Desires, persuaded they always have something *laudable* in View.

B. So, *Sir*, believing I have tir'd your Patience with *Syllogistical Gibberish*, I &c.

L. I am sure, *Sir*, B has not tir'd your Patience with one true *Syllogism* of his making, but you are the best Judge how far you can bear his *Gibberish*.

Nothing, you know, is more common than for Persons wholly ignorant of *Logick* to brand that noble *Science*, or one of its Parts, the *Syllogistick Art*, scoffingly and with an Air of unwarrantable Authority, by the Name of *syllogistical Gibberish*, or some such contemptible *Title*, it being much easier to despise, or affect to despise, any *Science* (for this costs nothing) than to attain it; but the worst on't is, *Religion*, (all sacred as it is) meets with as little Respect as *Logick*, from a certain Set of *Gentlemen* B seems not unacquainted with, tho' the best on't is, they have as little *Reason* as *Piety*; tho' this I'll freely grant, that all human Reasonings would deserve no better Name than that of *Gibberish*, did it any way resemble what B calls his conlusive, rational and pertinent *Syllogism*.

In such a Case indeed, you must needs have Provocation enough to be tir'd of *Gibberish*, tho' all B--'s pretended *Syllogisms* are
of

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of this *Stamp*, and his other Attempts to
Reason no better, for Want, I think, of *true*
Principles, and some Knowledge in *Logick*.
One must be allow'd to speak plain in the
Cause of *Truth*.

I am, with Respect, Sir,

your obliged humble

servant, L.



